2.3 The Paradox of 101 Dalmatians

Is Oscar-minus a dog? Why then should we deny that Oscar-minus is per dog? We saw above that one possible response sicuro Chrysippus’ paradox was preciso claim that Oscar-minus does not exist at \(t’\). But even if we adopt this view, how does it follow that Oscar-minus, existing as it does at \(t\), is not verso dog? Yet if Oscar-minus is a dog, then, given the canone account of identity, there are two dogs where we would normally count only one. Per fact, for each of Oscar’s hairs, of which there are at least 101, there is verso proper part of Oscar – Oscar minus verso hair – which is just as much per dog as Oscar-minus.

There are then at least 101 dogs (and con fact many more) where we would count only one. Some claim that things such as dogs are “maximal. One might conclude as much simply preciso avoid multiplying the number of dogs populating the space reserved for Oscar bolla. But the maximality principle may seem to be independently justified as well. When Oscar barks, do all these different dogs bark con unison? If verso thing is per dog, shouldn’t it be courtaud of independent https://datingranking.net/it/twoo-review/ action? Yet Oscar-minus cannot act independently of Oscar. Nevertheless, David Lewis (1993) has suggested verso reason for counting Oscar-minus and all the 101 dog parts that differ (per various different ways) from one another and Oscar by a hair, as dogs, and durante fact as Dalmatians (Oscar is verso Dalmatian).

Lewis invokes Unger’s (1980) “problem of the many. His hairs loosen and then dislodge, some such remaining still per place. Hence, within Oscar’s compass at any given time there are congeries of Dalmatian parts sooner or later esatto become definitely Dalmatians; some durante verso day, some sopra per second, or verso split second. It seems arbitrary onesto proclaim verso Dalmatian part that is a split second away from becoming definitely verso Dalmatian, verso Dalmatian, while denying that one verso day away is per Dalmatian. As Lewis puts it, we must either deny that the “many” are Dalmatians, or we must deny that the Dalmatians are many. Lewis endorses proposals of both types but seems to favor one of the latter type according to which the Dalmatians are not many but rather “almost one” Con any case, the canone account of identity seems unable on its own puro handle the paradox of 101 Dalmatians.

It requires that we either deny that Oscar minus a hair is verso dog – and verso Dalmatian – or else that we must affirm that there is verso multiplicity of Dalmatians, all but one of which is incapable of independent action and all of which bark sopra unison no more loudly than Oscar barks alone.

2.4 The Paradox of Constitution

Suppose that on day 1 Jones purchases per piece of clay \(c\) and fashions it into a statue \(s_1\). On day 2, Jones destroys \(s_1\), but not \(c\), by squeezing \(s_1\) into per ball and fashions verso new statue \(s_2\) out of \(c\). On day 3, Jones removes a part of \(s_2\), discards it, and replaces it using verso new piece of clay, thereby destroying \(c\) and replacing it by per new piece of clay, \(c’\). Presumably, \(s_2\) survives this change. Now what is the relationship between the pieces of clay and the statues they “constitute?” Verso natural answer is: identity. On day \(1, c\) is identical to \(s_1\) and on day \(2, c\) is identical onesto \(s_2\). On day \(3, s_2\) is identical to \(c’\). But this conclusion directly contradicts NI. If, on day \(1, c\) is (identical puro) \(s_1\), then it follows, given NI, that on day \(2, s_1\) is \(s_2\) (since \(c\) is identical onesto \(s_2\) on day 2) and hence that \(s_1\) exists on day 2, which it does not. By per similar argument, on day \(3, c\) is \(c’\) (since \(s_2\) is identical sicuro both) and so \(c\) exists on day 3, which it does not. We might conclude, then, that either constitution is not identity or that NI is false. Neither conclusion is wholly welcome. Once we adopt the norma account less NI, the latter principle follows directly from the assumption that individual variables and constants con quantified modal logic are preciso be handled exactly as they are con first-order logic. And if constitution is not identity, and yet statues, as well as pieces of clay, are physical objects (and what else would they be?), then we are again forced preciso affirm that distinct physical objects di nuovo time. The statue \(s_1\) and the piece of clay \(c\) occupy the same space on day 1. Even if this is deemed possible (Wiggins 1980), it is unparsimonious. The canone account is thus avanti facie incompatible with the natural idea that constitution is identity.